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DIRECTORATE OF  
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Center)*

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

Dept of State review(s) completed.

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
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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

Military Developments in North Vietnam: Initial poststrike photography indicates that two power plants on the outskirts of Haiphong were severely damaged by a two-phase air attack on 20 April.

Prior to these attacks, air strikes had inflicted extensive damage on electrical power plants at Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri, Hon Gai, and Bac Giang. All but Bac Giang had been rendered inoperative. These four plants supplied more than half the power for the national power grid.

Damage to the four named plants probably eliminated nonessential use of electricity in Hanoi and Haiphong and restricted power available for essential use. Probably only a small portion of the power loss can be offset by diesel generating equipment. (Map)

Communist Military Developments: Partial confirmation of the heavy losses believed inflicted during 1966 on the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA) 3rd Division has been supplied [redacted]

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[redacted]  
the division, which operates in coastal Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai provinces, had more than 3,400 casualties in 1966. More than 1,000 weapons were also lost by the division, [redacted] These figures compare relatively well with US order of battle estimates for the 3rd Division. These estimates placed its strength at approximately 8,000 at the end of 1966, compared with nearly 11,000 at the start of the year. The NVA 3rd Division was in several heavy battles during the year with allied search-and-destroy operations.

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Reportedly the division's replacements--totaling more than 1,000--include both infiltrators from North Vietnam and locally recruited personnel. Women, who filled support roles to release men for combat duty, have been among the replacements.

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Afghanistan: A political crisis has developed in Kabul which could threaten the continued tenure of Mohammed Maiwandwal as prime minister.

The crisis developed following the circulation in Kabul of rumors based largely on allegations made publicly in the US by an Afghan student that Maiwandwal was installed as prime minister with US collusion. Maiwandwal reportedly tendered his resignation to King Zahir on 18 April.

The King [ ] has not yet accepted the resignation. He probably would prefer to keep Maiwandwal in office--at least until the present crisis blows over. Strong support from Zahir probably would enable Maiwandwal to weather the storm.

The King has indicated that if he is forced to replace Maiwandwal he would choose a "strong man" as his successor. There is speculation in Kabul political circles that this could be the present ambassador to the Soviet Union, General Mohammed Aref. [ ]

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Panama: The Panamanian delegation to Punta del Este returned home with renewed confidence that negotiations on the canal treaties can be concluded this summer.

Addressing enthusiastic crowds at the airport, President Robles emphasized that President Johnson had "manifested great sympathy for resolving outstanding issues" and had ordered his subordinates to accelerate the pace of the negotiations.

A note of concern, however, was sounded by Finance Minister David Samudio, a leading "precandidate" for the presidency. Samudio told an embassy officer that although the Johnson-Robles meeting "went off very well," he was worried that the Panamanian public had anticipated more tangible results.

Similar concern tempered the general satisfaction expressed in news media owned by leaders of the government coalition parties. Opposition leaders and their newspapers characterized the talks as vague, and some editorials questioned whether the official version of them was "complete and frank."

Robles has undoubtedly gained political prestige from his meetings with President Johnson. With the canal treaties again in the public eye, however, Robles will find it increasingly difficult to insulate the negotiations from partisan politics connected with next year's elections.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 20 April 1967 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 86.2-67, "Prospects for Stability in the Dominican Republic Over the Next Year Or So"

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
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